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Pro-social punishment and exclusion are common means to elevate the level of cooperation among unrelated
individuals. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that the combined use of these two strategies is quite common across
human societies. However, it is still not known how a combined strategy where punishment and exclusion are
switched can promote cooperation from the theoretical perspective. In this paper, we thus propose two different
switching strategies, namely peer switching that is based on peer punishment and peer exclusion, and pool
switching that is based on pool punishment and pool exclusion. Individuals adopting the switching strategy
will punish defectors when their numbers are below a threshold and exclude them otherwise. We study how
the two switching strategies influence the evolutionary dynamics in the public goods game. We show that an
intermediate value of the threshold leads to a stable coexistence of cooperators, defectors and players adopting
the switching strategy in a well-mixed population, and this regardless of whether the pool-based or the peer-
based switching strategy is introduced. Moreover, we show that the pure exclusion strategy alone is able to evoke
a limit cycle attractor in the evolutionary dynamics, such that cooperation can coexist with other strategies.
Large-scale cooperation among unrelated individuals
distinguishes humans markedly from other animals, and
it is indeed crucial for our evolutionary success. Coop-
eration is remarkable because it is costly for the individ-
ual that cooperates, but it is beneficial for the society as
a whole. As such, to cooperate is in contradiction with
the Darwinistic principle of maximizing personal fitness,
and it is therefore challenged by defection. Individuals are
thus torn between what is best for them and what is best
for the society – the blueprint of a social dilemma. The
theoretical framework for studying this fascinating aspect
of our biology is evolutionary game theory, with the most
commonly used games being the prisoner’s dilemma and
the public goods game. The latter two games describe the
essence of the problem succinctly for pairwise and group
interactions, respectively. The resolution of social dilem-
mas towards the pro-social outcome has received ample
attention in the recent past. In our paper, we extend the
scope of the classic public goods game with cooperators
and defectors to account for a new third type of strat-
egy, namely the switching strategy that either punishes or
excludes defectors depending on their numbers. Our re-
search reveals fascinatingly different evolutionary dynam-
ics, including the stable coexistence of three strategies and
limit cycles, which enables cooperators to survive where
otherwise they would perish. These results have impor-
tant implications for the better understanding of coopera-
tion, and we also hope they will be inspiring for economic
experiments in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The emergence of altruistic behavior among unrelated indi-
viduals has been a puzzling phenomenon, since such behav-
ior is usually costly to perform but benefits others [1–12]. A
number of game theoretic researches over the past decades
have provided numerous answers to this question, such as
indirect reciprocity, reputation, reward, and punishment [13–
18, 20, 21]. Among them, scholars pay more attention to the
role of pro-social punishment played in promoting public co-
operation [19, 22–24]. Theoretical and experimental studies
have indicated that pro-social punishment can reduce the ex-
pected payoff of self-interested individuals since they need to
pay an extra fine [25–27]. However, such action is also costly,
it results in the second-order free-riders dilemma, in which
individuals may prefer to benefit from punishment but do not
contribute the related costs [28–35].
Social exclusion has recently drawn more attention since it
can perform better than costly punishment for maintaining co-
operation [36–41]. It is thought that social exclusion is still an
advantageous strategy even facing with a large number of free-
riders, due to the fact that excluding defectors from sharing
benefit can decrease the number of beneficiaries. Recently,
such exclusion strategy has been studied from an evolution-
ary perspective by Sasaki and Uchida [36]. The results show
that social exclusion strategy can overcome two difficulties of
costly punishment: first, rare punishers can not defeat a large
area of free-riders; second, punishers will be eliminated by
natural selection in the presence of second-order free-riders.
Subsequently, Liu et al. [40] studied the competition between
pro-social exclusion and punishment in finite populations, and
claimed that social exclusion can always do better than pun-
ishment.
It is worth pointing out that in most previous studies the
evolution of these two incentive strategies has been explored
in a manner in which the two strategies work independently
2[36, 40]. But in the realistic world, what is pretty widespread
is the combined use of these sanctioning strategies. It is still
unclear how such combined strategy can promote cooperation
from the theoretical perspective. Considering the different
roles of pro-social punishment and exclusion played in raising
cooperation, it is interesting to investigate how to jointly use
the two strategies for the promotion of cooperation. Notice
that a specific example in the realistic world is the problem of
environmental pollution control. If the number of enterprises
discharging pollutants illegally exceeds a given threshold, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will force these en-
terprises to suspend operations. Otherwise the EPA will im-
pose fines on them [42, 43].
In this paper, we thereby propose a switching strategy with
which individuals can either punish or exclude free-rider in
the public goods game (PGG) depending on the number of
defectors in the group. Specifically, if the number of defec-
tors in the group is above a certain threshold, individuals who
contribute to the monitoring organization will behave as ex-
cluders, otherwise they act as punishers. We consider these
assumptions and then construct a model based on the one in
our previous work [44]. Furthermore, in our model we fur-
ther consider that strategy-switching individuals need to pay a
monitoring cost, which is ignored in Ref. [44], but it is more
reasonable for real-world systems. This is because that moni-
toring the whole population and knowing the number of free-
riders in the population require a certain monitoring cost. We
find that a middle threshold can make the system converge to
a stable coexistence state of cooperators, defectors, and strat-
egy switching players nomatter whether pool-based switching
strategy or peer-based switching strategy is used. In addition,
we prove that when pure exclusion strategy is considered into
public goods games, the population system can exhibit a limit
cycle where cooperative strategy can coexist with other types
of strategies.
II. MODEL ANDMETHOD
A. Public goods game
We consider an infinite well-mixed of individuals who play
the public goods game. In a group of N individuals, each
player has the opportunity to cooperate by contributing to the
common pool with a cost c to itself, or act as defectors by con-
tributing nothing. Then the sum of all contributions in each
group is multiplied by an enhancement factor r (1 < r < N )
and equally distributed among all the N individuals. Thus if
all individuals choose to cooperate, the group can yield the
maximum benefit rc − c for each player. If all choose to de-
fect, the group can get nothing.
B. Switching strategy of pro-social punishment and exclusion
We introduce a switching strategy to depict the combined
use of pro-social punishment and exclusion. Different forms
of punishment strategies can be chosen based on whether the
number of defectors in the group exceeds the tolerance thresh-
old. Concretely, if the number of free-riders in the group
exceeds a given threshold T , those players with the switch-
ing strategy will exclude free-riders, otherwise punish them.
Thus, the levels of tolerance threshold are determined by the
number of defectors in the group, namely, T = 0, · · · , N . In
particular, T = 0 means that all free-riders will be excluded
from sharing public goods once there exist strategy-switching
players, while T = N means that all defectors will be pun-
ished. Here, we introduce two switching strategy, namely,
peer-based switching and pool-based switching. It is neces-
sary to point out that regardless of peer-based switching strat-
egy or pool-based switching strategy, strategy switching in-
dividuals need to bear a monitoring cost τ for detecting the
number of defectors in the group before they exclude or pun-
ish free-riders.
1. Peer-based switching strategy
Here we consider peer-based switching strategists who not
only contribute to the common pool but also monitor the num-
ber of free-riders in the group. If the level of defection exceeds
a certain level in the group, they become excluders who pre-
vent defectors collecting benefit from the public goods shar-
ing at a cost cE on every defector in the group, otherwise they
change to be punishers who impose a fine β on each free-rider
at a cost γ for themselves [45]. Then the payoffs of pure co-
operators (C), pure defectors (D), and peer-based switching
strategists (IE ) obtained from the group can be respectively
given by
piC =


rc− c, if NIE 6= 0 and ND ≥ T ;
rc(NC +NIE + 1)
N
− c, otherwise
(1)
piD =


0, if NIE 6= 0 andND ≥ T ;
rc(NC +NIE )
N
−NIEβ, otherwise
(2)
piIE =


rc− c−NDcE − τ, if ND ≥ T ;
rc(NC +NIE + 1)
N
− c−NDγ − τ, otherwise
(3)
where NC , ND, and NIE denote the numbers of coopera-
tors, defectors, and peer-based switching strategists among the
otherN − 1 players, respectively.
2. Pool-based switching strategy
Different from peer-based switching strategy, pool-based
switching strategists resort to the institution of monitoring
which can choose to exclude defectors or punish them by giv-
ing a corresponding fine B. The costs of exclusion and pun-
ishment are δ andG, respectively. Accordingly, the payoffs of
cooperators, defectors, and pool-based switching strategists
(IF ) obtained from the group can be respectively written as
3follows.
piC =


rc − c, if NIF 6= 0 and ND ≥ T ;
rc(NC +NIF + 1)
N
− c, otherwise
(4)
piD =


0, if NIF 6= 0 and ND ≥ T ;
rc(NC +NIF )
N
−NIFB, otherwise
(5)
piIF =


rc − c− δ − τ, if ND ≥ T ;
rc(NC +NIF + 1)
N
− c−G− τ, otherwise
(6)
whereNC , ND, andNIF denote the numbers of cooperators,
defectors, and pool-based switching strategists among theN−
1 players, respectively.
C. Replicator dynamics
In a well-mixed population the fraction of C,D, and I(IE
or IF ) players can be denoted by x, y, and z, respectively.
Thus, x, y, z ≥ 0 and x + y + z = 1. Consequently, the
strategy evolution can be studied by using replicator equations
[46–52] 

x˙ = x(PC − P¯ ),
y˙ = y(PD − P¯ ),
z˙ = z(PI − P¯ ),
(7)
where PC , PD, and PI represent the expected payoffs of
C,D, and I , respectively, and P¯ = xPC + yPD + zPI rep-
resents the average payoff of the whole population. And we
have
Pi =
N−1∑
NC=0
N−NC−1∑
ND=0
(
N − 1
NC
)(
N −NC − 1
ND
)
xNCyNDzN−NC−ND−1pii, (8)
where i = C, D, or I .
To better characterize the evolutionary dynamics of the
population for different switching threshold, we present our
results regarding the switching threshold in the form of bifur-
cation diagrams in the following section. In addition, we pro-
vide detailed theoretical analysis when the switching thresh-
old is set to N or 0. Unless otherwise specified, theoretical
analyses in special conditions are presented in Appendix A,
B, C, and D, respectively.
III. RESULTS
A. Evolutionary dynamics in the population with peer-based
switching strategy
We first present the results of evolutionary dynamics in
the population with peer-based switching strategy for differ-
ent values of T , as shown in Fig.1. Clearly, if level of toler-
ance is strong enough (T = N ), players will opt for defection
(more detailed theoretical analysis is shown in the Appendix
A.1). Besides, an unstable equilibrium point can appear on
edge IED (see Fig.1(a) and (b)). It needs to stress that a spe-
cific stable point appears on the edge IED when we decrease
threshold value slightly (see Fig.1(b)). For an intermediate
threshold (T = 3), a new dynamical characteristic appears,
that is, an interior stable equilibrium point displays the sim-
plex S3. With decreasing T , the interior stable point moves
along a straight line approximately parallel to the edge CD
(see Fig.1 (c), (d), and (e)). If T decreases still further to
T = 0, peer-based switching strategist will always use the
exclusion action, Interestingly, defectors will be excluded by
peer excluders, defectors dominate cooperators, and coopera-
tors invade peer excluders, forming a heteroclinic cycle on the
boundary of simplex S3. In order to judge the stability of this
heteroclinic cycle, we calculate the eigenvalues of the Jaco-
bian matrix of the three vertex equilibrium points as follows,

λ−IE = −(rc− c− τ), λ
+
IE
= τ,
λ−C = −τ, λ
+
C = c−
rc
N
,
λ−D =
rc
N
− c, λ+D = rc− c− τ − (N − 1)cE.
(9)
Then we define that λIE = −
λ
−
IE
λ
+
IE
, λC = −
λ
−
C
λ
+
C
, and λD =
−
λ
−
D
λ
+
D
, and we have λ = λIEλCλD =
rc−c−τ
rc−c−τ−(N−1)cE
> 1.
Thus the heteroclinic cycle is asymptotically stable [53] (see
Appendix B.3 for theoretical analysis). Besides, a stable limit
cycle exists in the interior of the simplex S3 (see Appendix
B.4 for theoretical analysis). Frequencies of three strategies
oscillate, but the interior equilibrium point is unstable (see
Fig.1(f), and more detailed theoretical analysis is presented
in the Appendix B.2).
In order to shed light on the details behind the results pre-
sented in Fig.1, we depict the frequency of the mentioned
three strategies as a function of time for different switching
thresholds in Fig.2. It can be observed that although pure de-
fectors can always occupy the highest proportion of the pop-
ulation for T ≥ 2, the evolutionary advantage of defectors is
weakened gradually with decreasing T (see Fig.2(a-d)). How-
ever, it is worth noting that when T = 1, pure cooperators
have higher fitness than defectors (see Fig.2(e)). In particular,
a periodic oscillation occurs when peer exclusion is performed
(see Fig.2(f)), which is corresponding to the stable limit cycle
shown in Fig.1(f).
B. Evolutionary dynamics in the population with pool-based
switching strategy
We next illustrate how the introduction of pool-based
switching strategy influences the cooperation level for differ-
ent T , as shown in Fig.3. When T = N , pool-based switch-
ing strategists will always act as pool punishers. In this case,
no interior equilibrium point appears in the simplex S3 since
PIF < PC , while an unstable equilibrium point exists on edge
IFD with z =
N(c+δ+τ)−rc
N(N−1)B (for further details, see Appendix
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this phase portraits will be changed when we reduce the toler-
ance threshold T . When T = 4, an interior stable equilibrium
point is present in the simplex S3, thus cooperators, defec-
tors, and pool-based switching strategists can coexist steadily
in the population (see Fig.3(b)). Furthermore, with decreas-
ing T the interior stable equilibrium point moves towards full
cooperation state (see Fig.3(b), (c), (d), and (e)). As a special
case of pool-based switching strategy, T = 0means that pool-
based switching strategists will always act as pool excluders.
The unique stable coexistent equilibrium point changes to a
center surrounding by periodic closed orbits. The reason is
that pool excluders invade defectors, cooperators invade pool
excluders, and defectors invade cooperators (see Fig.3(f)). To
analyze the dynamics in the interior of S3, we introduce a new
variable ε = x
x+y , which represents the fraction of coopera-
tors among members who do not contribute to the exclusion
pool. This yields
ε˙ = −ε(1− ε)(PD − PC).
By substituting x = ε(1 − z) and P¯ = x(PC − PD) +
(1 − z)(PD − PF ) + PF into z˙ = z(PF − P¯ ), we have
z˙ = z[x(PD − PC)− (1− z)(PD − PF )]. Thus we have
 ε˙ = −ε(1− ε)[(1− z)
N−1 rc(N − 1)
N
− rc+ c],
z˙ = z(1− z)[rc− c− δ − τ − ε(rc− c)].
Through detailed theoretical analysis, we can prove that the
system is a conservative Hamiltonian system (see Appendix
D.3 for details).
To further explain the results presented in Fig.3, we con-
tinue by showing the time evolution of the frequencies of
these three strategies for different values of T in Fig.4. When
T = N , defection strategy can be dominant, which is ir-
relevant to the initial state (see Fig.4(a)). Furthermore, by
decreasing the tolerance level, however, we can observe the
fraction of cooperators increases (see Fig.4(b), (c), (d), and
(e)). Of particular note is that pure cooperation strategy can
become the most advantageous strategy when T is set to an
intermediate value, e.g. T = 2. As T is decreased further,
the advantage of cooperators is further enhanced (see Fig.4(d)
and (e)). Particularly, for T = 0 the frequencies of C,D, and
IF display periodic oscillations, which correspond to the limit
cycle in Fig.3(f).
IV. DISCUSSION
Thus far, many previous theoretical works have revealed
that pro-social punishment and exclusion strategies can both
maintain sufficiently high levels of public cooperation no mat-
ter whether these two strategies are implemented separately
or jointly [36, 38, 40]. However, few studies have thus far
considered the combined use of these two strategies despite
it is particularly common in our real society. In this paper,
we have introduced the switching strategy with which indi-
viduals can either punish or exclude free-riders in the public
goods game (PGG), depending on the number of defectors in
the group. Based on the evolutionary game theoretical models
we have studied the evolutionary dynamics in the well-mixed
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population with two different switching forms, by focusing
particularly on the role of switching threshold played in the
evolutionary dynamics of cooperation.
We have shown that a stable coexistence state among co-
operators, defectors, and peer-based switching strategists can
appear when an intermediate switching threshold is used. In
addition, the reduction of switching threshold can enhance the
level of public cooperation. It is necessary to point out that
the special cases in our model (T = N and T = 0 corre-
spond to peer exclusion and peer punishment, respectively)
have been investigated in a recent work [36], which demon-
strated that social exclusion strategy can not only avert free-
riders, but also prevent second-order free-riders from invad-
ing, which solves the two substantial difficulties of peer pun-
ishment. Interestingly, we find that the introduction of an ob-
servation cost will completely change the evolutionary results
of these two strategies in our model. Concretely, the coex-
istence of cooperators and peer punishers will disappear, and
defection becomes a global stability strategy (see Fig.1(a)).
Or, the periodic oscillations among the three strategies re-
place the coexistence of cooperators and peer excluders (see
Fig.1(f)). Although similar shapes of oscillations have been
presented in previous works [54, 55] where oscillations are
caused by the feedback between players’ payoffs and their lo-
cal interaction topology or the cyclic dominance of the three
species, the mechanisms for the oscillations between our work
and the two studies mentioned above are different. In our
work, we investigate the evolutionary dynamics among co-
operators, defectors, and switching strategists in an infinite
population. The oscillation is caused by the mutual restric-
tion among these three strategists, that is, defectors will be
excluded by peer excluders, defectors defeat cooperators, and
cooperators invade peer excluders.
We have also investigated the evolutionary dynamics of
pool-based switching strategy and revealed that in addition
to the two special cases (T = 0 and T = N correspond
to the case of pool punishment and pool exclusion, respec-
tively) mentioned above, the intermediate switching threshold
values can guarantee the stable coexistence state of coopera-
tors, defectors, and pool-based switching strategists. It needs
to point that the result is stile valid even the cost of exclu-
sion exceeds four times than we given in Fig.3. Furthermore,
the decrease of threshold value will weaken the advantage of
defectors in evolution. Particularly, if switching threshold is
zero, the result shows that there can be isolated periodic or-
bits and hence cooperators, defectors, and pool excluders can
coexist by forming limit cycles (see Fig.3(f)).
Finally, we have to note that the switching strategy pro-
posed in this work can better induce the stable coexistence
state for cooperation compared with pure punishment or pure
exclusion strategies. Besides, such switching strategy can
flexibly manage public goods in different environments, such
as punishing exiguous free-riders in favorable surroundings
or excluding massive free-riders in extremely unfavorable en-
vironments. Thus, the presently discussed strategy offers a
simple, but still effective, way on how we can better promote
the stable coexistence of different strategies including cooper-
ation.
7APPENDIX A
A.1 Peer punishment
We first study the replicator dynamics for defectors (D), co-
operators (C), and peer punishers (W). This corresponds to the
special case for peer-based switching strategy with T = N .
We denote by x, y, and z the frequencies of C, D, and W,
respectively. Thus x, y, z ≥ 0 and x+ y + z = 1. The evolu-
tionary fate of the population can be modeled by the replicator
equations, given as 

x˙ = x(PC − P¯ ),
y˙ = y(PD − P¯ ),
z˙ = z(PW − P¯ ),
(A.10)
where PC , PD, and PW denote the expected payoffs of these
three strategies and P¯ = xPC + yPD + zPW describes the
average payoff of the entire population.
Accordingly, the expected payoffs of these three strategies
can be respectively given by
PC =
rc
N
(N − 1)(x+ z) +
rc
N
− c,
PD =
rc
N
(N − 1)(x+ z)− (N − 1)zβ,
PW =
rc
N
(N − 1)(x+ z) +
rc
N
− c− (N − 1)yγ − τ.
Since PW < PC , there is no interior fixed point. Then we
investigate the dynamics on each edge of the simplex S3. On
the edge C-D we have z = 0, resulting in y˙ = y(1− y)(PD−
PC) = y(1 − y)(c −
rc
N
) > 0. Thus the direction of the
dynamics goes from C to D. On the edge D-W, since x = 0
and y + z = 1, we have z˙ = z(1 − z)(PW − PD). Here we
assume that 0 < c+ τ − rc
N
+ (N − 1)γ < (N − 1)(γ + β),
thus solvingPW = PD results in z =
c+(N−1)γ+τ−rc
N
(N−1)(β+γ) , which
means that there exists a boundary fixed point on the edge D-
W. On the edge C-W, since y = 0 and x + z = 1, we have
x˙ = x(1−x)(PC −PW ) = x(1−x)τ > 0, thus the direction
of the dynamics goes from W to C.
Therefore there are four equilibria, namely, three vertex
fixed points ((x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and (0, 1, 0))
and the boundary fixed point ((x, y, z) = (0, 1 −
c+(N−1)γ+τ−rc
N
(N−1)(β+γ) ,
c+(N−1)γ+τ−rc
N
(N−1)(β+γ) )) in the simplex S3.
A.2 The stabilities of equilibria
Here we define
f(x, y) = x[(1 − x)(PC − PW )− y(PD − PW )],
g(x, y) = y[(1− y)(PD − PW )− x(PC − PW )].
Then the Jacobian matrix of the equation system is
J =
[
∂f(x,y)
∂x
∂f(x,y)
∂y
∂g(x,y)
∂x
∂g(x,y)
∂y
]
, (A.11)
where

∂f(x, y)
∂x
= [(1 − x)(PC − PW )− y(PD − PW )]
+ x[−(PC − PW ) + (1− x)
∂
∂x
(PC − PW )
− y
∂
∂x
(PD − PW )],
∂f(x, y)
∂y
= x[(1 − x)
∂
∂y
(PC − PW )− (PD − PW )
− y
∂
∂y
(PD − PW )],
∂g(x, y)
∂x
= y[(1− y)
∂
∂x
(PD − PW )− (PC − PW )
− x
∂
∂x
(PC − PW )],
∂g(x, y)
∂y
= [(1 − y)(PD − PW )− x(PC − PW )]
+ y[−(PD − PW ) + (1 − y)
∂
∂y
(PD − PW )
− x
∂
∂y
(PC − PW )].
(A.12)
Then we have the following conclusion.
Theorem 1. For 1 < r < N , only the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is
stable, and the other equilibria (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and (0, 1 −
c+(N−1)γ+τ−rc
N
(N−1)(β+γ) ,
c+(N−1)γ+τ−rc
N
(N−1)(β+γ) ) are unstable.
Proof. (1) For (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), the Jacobian is
J =
[
τ 0
0 c+ τ − rc
N
− (N − 1)β
]
, (A.13)
thus the fixed point is unstable since τ > 0.
(2) For (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[
−τ −(c+ τ − rc
N
)
0 c− rc
N
]
, (A.14)
thus the fixed point is unstable since 1− r
N
> 0.
(3) For (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[
rc
N
− c 0
−τ − (N − 1)γ rc
N
− c− τ − (N − 1)γ
]
, (A.15)
thus the fixed point is stable since rc
N
− c < 0.
(4) For (x, y, z) = (0, 1 −
c+(N−1)γ+τ−rc
N
(N−1)(β+γ) ,
c+(N−1)γ+τ−rc
N
(N−1)(β+γ) ), the Jacobian is
J =
[
a11 0
a21 a22
]
, (A.16)
where a11 = (N − 1)yγ + τ, a21 = y(1 − y)β(N − 1) −
(N − 1)y2γ − τy, and a22 = y(1 − y)(N − 1)(β + γ), thus
the fixed point is unstable since y(1− y)(N − 1)(β + γ) > 0
and (N − 1)yγ + τ > 0.
8APPENDIX B
B.1 Peer exclusion
We now consider another special case for peer-based
switching strategy with T = 0. Thus the replicator equations
are written as 

x˙ = x(PC − P¯ ),
y˙ = y(PD − P¯ ),
z˙ = z(PE − P¯ ),
(B.17)
where P¯ = xPC + yPD + zPE represents the average payoff
of the entire population.
We assume that exclusion never fails. In this condition, we
can formalize the expected payoffs as follows
PC = rc − c− (1− z)
N−1 rc(N − 1)y
N(1− z)
, (B.18)
PD = (1 − z)
N−1 rc(N − 1)x
N(1− z)
, (B.19)
PE = rc − c− (N − 1)ycE − τ. (B.20)
Remark 1: Because of z = 1 − x − y, the system (B.17)
becomes{
x˙ = x[(1 − x)(PC − PE)− y(PD − PE)],
y˙ = y[(1− y)(PD − PE)− x(PC − PE)],
(B.21)
where
PC − PE = (N − 1)ycE + τ − (1− z)
N−1 rc(N − 1)y
N(1− z)
,
PD − PE = (1− z)
N−1 rc(N − 1)x
N(1− z)
− rc+ c+ (N − 1)ycE + τ.
Theorem 2. For [N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 (N − 1)cE < rc − c − τ <
min{(N − 1)cE, [
N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 (N − 1)cE +
rc−c
[N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−
(N − 1)cE}, the system (B.21) has five fixed points, namely,
(x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, rc−c−τ(N−1)cE , 1 −
rc−c−τ
(N−1)cE
), and ([N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 −
τ
(r−1)c
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−(N−1)cE
, τ(r−1)c
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−(N−1)cE
, 1 −
[N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 ).
Proof. By solving system equations (B.21), we can
easily know that there are three vertex fixed points,
namely, (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), and (1, 0, 0). Then solv-
ing PC = PD results in z = 1 − [
N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 .
When
(r−1)c
[N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
− (N − 1)cE > τ , solving
PC = PE leads to y =
τ
(r−1)c
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−(N−1)cE
. Thus
there exists an interior fixed point ([N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 −
τ
(r−1)c
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−(N−1)cE
, τ(r−1)c
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−(N−1)cE
, 1 −
[N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 ) in the simplex S3.
Then, we study the dynamics on each edge of simplex S3.
On the edge E-D, y + z = 1 results in z˙ = z(1 − z)(PE −
PD) = z(1 − z)[rc − c − τ − (N − 1)ycE], thus there is an
equilibrium y = rc−c−τ(N−1)cE for 0 < rc − c− τ < (N − 1)cE ,
otherwise E can perform better than D. On the edge C-E, we
have x+z = 1 and x˙ = x(1−x)(PC−PE) = x(1−x)τ > 0,
thus the direction of the dynamics goes from E to C. On the
edge C-D, D can defeat C, as presented in Appendix A.1.
B.2 The stabilities of equilibria
Theorem 3. In the conditions of Theorem 2,
only the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is stable, and the
other equilibria (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, rc−c−τ(N−1)cE , 1 −
rc−c−τ
(N−1)cE
), and ([N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 −
τ
(r−1)c
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−(N−1)cE
, τ(r−1)c
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−(N−1)cE
, 1 −
[N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 ) are unstable.
Proof. We also use the Jacobian matrix of the system to
study the stability of equilibria.
(1) For (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), the Jacobian is
J =
[
τ 0
0 −(rc− c− τ)
]
, (B.22)
thus the fixed point is unstable since τ > 0.
(2) For (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[
−τ −(c+ τ − rc
N
)
0 c− rc
N
]
, (B.23)
thus the fixed point is a unstable since 1− r
N
> 0.
(3) For (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[
rc
N
− c 0
a21 rc − c− τ − (N − 1)cE
]
, (B.24)
where a21 = −(
rc
N
−rc+(N−1)cE+τ), thus the fixed point
is unstable when rc − c − τ − (N − 1)cE > 0, while when
rc − c − τ − (N − 1)cE < 0 it is stable. Particularly, when
rc− c− τ − (N − 1)cE = 0, we can prove this fixed point is
stable by using center manifold theorem (see Theorem. 4 for
detail analysis).
(4) When rc − c − τ − (N − 1)cE < 0 there is a boundary
equilibrium point (x, y, z) = (0, rc−c−τ(N−1)cE , 1−
rc−c−τ
(N−1)cE
), then
the Jacobian is
J =
[
a11 0
a21 a22
]
, (B.25)
where a11 = (N − 1)ycE − y
N−1 rc(N−1)
N
+ τ, a21 =
yN−1 rc
N
(N − 1) − (N − 1)y2cE − yτ, and a22 = y(1 −
y)(N − 1)cE , thus the fixed point is unstable since y(1 −
9y)(N − 1)cE > 0.
(5) When τ < rc − c − [N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 (N − 1)cE < τ +
rc−c
[N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
− (N − 1)cE , there is an interior equilibrium
point (x, y, z) = ([N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 − τ(r−1)c
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−(N−1)cE
,
τ
(r−1)c
[
N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
−(N−1)cE
, 1−[N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 ), we define the equi-
librium point as (x∗, y∗, z∗) hereafter. And the elements in the
Jacobian matrix for this equilibrium point are written as

∂f
∂x
(x∗, y∗) = x∗[(1− x∗)
∂
∂x
(PC − PE)− y
∗ ∂
∂x
(PD − PE)],
∂f
∂y
(x∗, y∗) = x∗[(1− x∗)
∂
∂y
(PC − PE)− y
∗ ∂
∂y
(PD − PE)],
∂g
∂x
(x∗, y∗) = y∗[(1 − y∗)
∂
∂x
(PD − PE)− x
∗ ∂
∂x
(PC − PE)],
∂g
∂y
(x∗, y∗) = y∗[(1 − y∗)
∂
∂y
(PD − PE)− x
∗ ∂
∂y
(PC − PE)],
where

∂
∂x
(PC − PE) = −(x
∗ + y∗)N−3
rcy∗(N − 1)(N − 2)
N
,
∂
∂y
(PC − PE) = (N − 1)cE − (x
∗ + y∗)N−3
rc(N − 1)
N
[(N − 1)y∗ + x∗],
∂
∂x
(PD − PE) = (x
∗ + y∗)N−3
rc(N − 1)
N
[(N − 1)x∗ + y∗],
∂
∂y
(PD − PE) = (N − 1)cE + (x
∗ + y∗)N−3
rcx∗(N − 1)(N − 2)
N
.
Then we define that p1 =
∂f
∂x
(x∗, y∗) ∂g
∂y
(x∗, y∗) −
∂f
∂y
(x∗, y∗) ∂g
∂x
(x∗, y∗) and q1 =
∂f
∂x
(x∗, y∗)+ ∂g
∂y
(x∗, y∗). We
know that
p1 = x
∗y∗(1− x∗ − y∗)[
∂
∂x
(PC − PE)
∂
∂y
(PD − PE)
−
∂
∂y
(PC − PE)
∂
∂x
(PD − PE)]
= x∗y∗(1− x∗ − y∗)
rc(N − 1)3
N
(x∗ + y∗)N−2[(x∗
+ y∗)N−2
rc
N
− 1]
< 0,
and
q1 = x
∗(1− x∗)
∂
∂x
(PC − PE) + y
∗(1− y∗)
∂
∂y
(PD − PE)
− x∗y∗[
∂
∂x
(PD − PE) +
∂
∂y
(PC − PE)]
= (N − 1)cEy
∗(1− y∗ − x∗)
> 0.
We thus conclude that the Jacobian matrix has a positive
eigenvalue. Therefore the interior equilibrium point is unsta-
ble.
Theorem 4. For rc− c− τ − (N −1)cE = 0, the equilibrium
point (0, 1, 0) is stable.
Proof. Because y = 1−x−z, the dynamic equations (B.21)
become{
x˙ = x[(1− x)(PC − PD)− z(PE − PD)],
z˙ = z[(1− z)(PE − PD)− x(PC − PD)],
(B.26)
where
PC − PD = rc − c− (1− z)
N−1 rc(N − 1)
N
,
PE − PD = rc − c− (N − 1)ycE − τ
− (1 − z)N−1
rc(N − 1)x
N(1− z)
.
We know that (x, z) = (0, 0) is equilibrium point of system
(B.26). Then the Jacobian is
A =
[
rc
N
− c 0
0 rc− c− τ − (N − 1)cE
]
. (B.27)
When rc− c− τ − (N − 1)cE = 0, we know that the eigen-
values of the Jacobian for the fixed point (x, z) = (0, 0) are
0 and rc
N
− c. In this condition, we study the stability of the
equilibrium point by further using the center manifold theo-
rem [56–58]. To do that, we construct a matrix M , whose
column elements are the eigenvectors of the matrix A, given
as
M =
[
0 1
1 0
]
. (B.28)
Let T = M−1, then we have
TAT−1 =
[
0 0
0 rc
N
− c
]
. (B.29)
Using variable substitution, we have[
j
i
]
= T
[
x
z
]
=
[
0 1
1 0
] [
x
z
]
=
[
z
x
]
. (B.30)
Therefore, the system (B.26) can be rewritten as

j˙ = j(1− j)[rc − c− (N − 1)(1− j − i)cE
− τ − (1− j)N−1
rc(N − 1)i
N(1− j)
]
− ji[rc− c− (1− j)N−1
rc(N − 1)
N
],
i˙ = i(1− i)[rc− c− (1− j)N−1
rc(N − 1)
N
]
− ji[rc− c− (N − 1)(1− j − i)cE − τ
− (1− j)N−1
rc(N − 1)i
N(1− j)
].
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Using the center manifold theorem, we have that j = h(i) is a
center manifold for the above system. Then the dynamics on
the center manifold can be described by
i˙ = i(1− i)[rc− c− (1− h(i))N−1
rc(N − 1)
N
]
− h(i)i[rc− c− (N − 1)(1− h(i)− i)cE − τ
− (1− h(i))N−1
rc(N − 1)i
N(1− h(i))
]. (B.31)
We start to try h(i) = O(i2), thus the system (B.31) can be
expressed as
i˙ = i(1− i)[rc− c−
rc(N − 1)
N
] +O(|i|3). (B.32)
By defining m(i) = i(1 − i)[rc − c − rc(N−1)
N
], we have
m
′
(i) = (1 − 2i)[rc − c − rc(N−1)
N
]. Since m
′
(0) < 0, thus
we can judge that i = 0 is asymptotically stable. Therefore,
we can know the fixed point (i, h(i)) = (0, 0) is also stable
for the system (B.26). Accordingly, the fixed point (0, 1, 0) is
stable as well [56–58].
B.3 Heteroclinic cycle
In this subsection, we show that there is a stable heteroclinic
cycle on the boundary of the simplex CDIE (see Fig. 1 (f)).
When rc − c − τ − (N − 1)cE > 0 and r < N , we know
that the three vertex equilibrium points (C,D, and IE ) are all
saddle nodes, and the heteroclinic trajectories can display on
the three edges (CD,DIE , and IEC). All of these guarantee
the existence of the heteroclinic cycle on the boundary S3.
In the following, we will prove that the heteroclinic cycle is
asymptotically stable.
According to Theorem 3, we can get the eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix of the three vertex equilibrium points,
namely, λ−IE = −(rc − c − τ), λ
+
IE
= τ, λ−C = −τ, λ
+
C =
c− rc
N
, λ−D =
rc
N
−c, and λ+D = rc−c−τ− (N−1)cE . Then
we define that λIE = −
λ
−
IE
λ
+
IE
, λC = −
λ
−
C
λ
+
C
, and λD = −
λ
−
D
λ
+
D
,
and we have λ = λIEλCλD =
rc−c−τ
rc−c−τ−(N−1)cE
> 1. Thus
the heteroclinic cycle is asymptotically stable [53].
B.4 Limit cycle
Next, we prove that a stable limit cycle can exist in the sim-
plex CDIE (see Fig. 1 (f)). According to the above theo-
retical analysis, we know that the interior fixed point of the
system is unstable. Now we set a closed domain Γ that con-
tains the interior fixed point on the phase plane of the system
(B.21). Here we take a straight line l = x+ y− b = 0, where
b is an undetermined constant. In order to determine the di-
rection of the trajectory of the system, we solve the derivative
of the equation l = x+ y − b. Thus we have
∂l
∂t
=
∂x
∂t
+
∂y
∂t
= x(1 − x− y)[(N − 1)ycE + τ − (x + y)
N−1 rc(N − 1)y
N(x+ y)
]
+ y(1− x− y)[(x+ y)N−1
rc(N − 1)x
N(x+ y)
− rc+ c
+ (N − 1)ycE + τ ]
= (1− x− y)[(N − 1)ycE(x+ y) + (x+ y)τ − (rc − c)y]
= (1− b)[(N − 1)ycEb+ bτ − (rc − c)y]. (B.33)
Thus when b is sufficiently large, we know that ∂l
∂t
< 0. In
this case, the straight line l = x+y−b = 0, x = 0, and y = 0
are enclosed in a closed domain Γ that points to the interior of
the boundary.
On the straight line x = x∗, we select a point (x∗, y1),
where y1 is slightly larger than y
∗, and the trajectory that
passes through (x∗, y1) surrounds the interior fixed point
(x∗, y∗), then intersects with the straight line x = x∗ at an-
other point (x∗, y2) which meets y2 > y
∗. Since the interior
fixed point (x∗, y∗) is unstable, we have y2 > y1. The trajec-
tory from (x∗, y1) to (x
∗, y2) and the line segment y1y2 form
a closed domain Γ0 containing the interior fixed point. The
trajectories on the boundary of the closed domain Γ0 are all
diverged outward. Thus a ring domain is formed between the
boundaries of the closed domains Γ and Γ0, and the trajecto-
ries on the boundary of the inner and outer ring will go to the
interior of the domain. Accordingly, we prove that there exist
a stable limit cycle in the closed domain Γ [56].
APPENDIX C
C.1 Pool punishment
Next, we analyze the replicator dynamics for public goods
game with pool punishment, which corresponds to the spe-
cial case for pool-based switching strategy with T = N . Ac-
cordingly, there are three strategists, namely, cooperators, de-
fectors, and pool punishers, respectively. Thus the replicator
equations can be written as

x˙ = x(PC − P¯ ),
y˙ = y(PD − P¯ ),
z˙ = z(PV − P¯ ),
(C.34)
where P¯ = xPC + yPD + zPV is the average payoff of the
whole population. Then the expected payoffs of these three
strategies can be respectively given by
PC =
rc
N
(N − 1)(x+ z) +
rc
N
− c, (C.35)
PD =
rc
N
(N − 1)(x+ z)−B(N − 1)z, (C.36)
PV =
rc
N
(N − 1)(x+ z) +
rc
N
− c−G− τ, (C.37)
11
where (N−1)(x+z) denotes the expected number of contrib-
utors among theN − 1 co-players, andB(N − 1)z represents
the expected fine on a defector.
Theorem 5. For r < N , the system (C.34) has four fixed
points, namely, (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), and
(0, 1− N(c+G+τ)−rc
N(N−1)B ,
N(c+G+τ)−rc
N(N−1)B ).
Proof. By solving the system equations (C.34), we can
know that there are three vertex equilibrium points, namely,
(x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), and (1, 0, 0).
There is no interior fixed point since PV < PC . Then, we
study the dynamics on each edge of simplex S3. On the edge
V-D, y + z = 1 results in z˙ = z(1 − z)(PV − PD) = z(1 −
z)[ rc
N
− c−G− τ +B(N − 1)z], thus there is an equilibrium
z = N(c+G+τ)−rc
N(N−1)B for 0 <
N(c+G+τ)−rc
N(N−1)B < 1. On the edge
C-V, we have x + z = 1 and x˙ = x(1 − x)(PC − PV ) =
x(1−x)(G+ τ) > 0, thus the direction of the dynamics goes
from V to C. On the edge C-D, D can defeat C, as presented
in Appendix A.1.
C.2 The stabilities of equilibria
Theorem 6. In the conditions of Theorem 5, the fixed point
(0, 1, 0) is stable, while the others ((0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0), and
(0, 1− N(c+G+τ)−rc
N(N−1)B ,
N(c+G+τ)−rc
N(N−1)B )) are unstable.
Proof. (1) For (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), the Jacobian is
J =
[
G+ τ 0
0 −B(N − 1) + c+G+ τ − rc
N
]
, (C.38)
thus the fixed point is unstable since G+ τ > 0.
(2) For (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[
−τ −G −(c+ τ +G− rc
N
)
0 c− rc
N
]
, (C.39)
thus the fixed point is unstable since c− rc
N
> 0.
(3) For (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0), the Jacobian is
J =
[
rc
N
− c 0
−(G+ τ) rc
N
− c− τ −G
]
, (C.40)
thus the fixed point is stable since rc
N
− c < 0.
(4) For (x, y, z) = (0, 1−N(c+G+τ)−rc
N(N−1)B ,
N(c+G+τ)−rc
N(N−1)B ), then
the Jacobian is
J =
[
G+ τ 0
y(1− y)B(N − 1)− yGyτ y(1− y)(N − 1)B
]
,
(C.41)
thus the fixed point is unstable since G+ τ > 0.
APPENDIX D
D.1 Pool exclusion
In this subsection, we study the evolutionary dynamics of
pool exclusion, which corresponds to the special case for
pool-base switching strategy with T = 0. Then the replicator
equations become 

x˙ = x(PC − P¯ ),
y˙ = y(PD − P¯ ),
z˙ = z(PF − P¯ ),
(D.42)
where PC , PD, and PF are the expected payoffs of coopera-
tors, defectors, and pool excluders, respectively.
We also assume that exclusion never fails. In this condition,
we give the expected payoffs as follows
PC = rc− c− (1− z)
N−1 rc(N − 1)y
N(1− z)
, (D.43)
PD = (1− z)
N−1 rc
N
(N − 1)
x
1− z
, (D.44)
PF = rc− c− δ − τ. (D.45)
Theorem 7. For r < N and δ+τ < rc−c, the system (D.42)
has four fixed points, namely, (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 0),
(0, 1, 0), and ([N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 −
(δ+τ)[N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
(r−1)c ,
(δ+τ)[N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
(r−1)c , 1− [
N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 ).
Proof. By solving the system equations (D.42), we can
know that there are three vertex equilibrium points, namely,
(0, 0, 1), (0, 1, 0), and (1, 0, 0).
Solving PC = PD results in z = 1 − [
N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 . Simi-
larly, by solving PC = PF , we have y =
(δ+τ)[N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
(r−1)c .
Thus when δ+ τ < rc− c, there exists an interior fixed point
([N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 −
(δ+τ)[
N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1
(r−1)c ,
(δ+τ)[
N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1
(r−1)c , 1 −
[N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 ).
Then we investigate the dynamics on each edge of the sim-
plex S3. On the edge C-D, we have z = 0, resulting in
y˙ = y(1 − y)(PD − PC) = y(1 − y)(c −
rc
N
) > 0. Thus
the direction of the dynamics goes from C to D.
On the edge D-F, we have z˙ = z(1 − z)(PF − PD) =
z(1−z)(rc−c−δ−τ) > 0, thus the direction of the dynamics
goes from D to EC.
On the edge C-F, we have x˙ = x(1 − x)(PC − PF ) =
x(1− x)(δ + τ) > 0, thus the direction of the dynamics goes
from F to C.
D.2 The stabilities of equilibria
Theorem 8. In the conditions of Theorem. 7, the three vertex
equilibria are unstable, and the interior fixed point is neutrally
stable surrounded by closed and periodic orbits.
Proof. (1) For (x, y, z) = (0, 0, 1), the Jacobian is
J(0, 0, 1) =
[
δ + τ 0
0 −rc+ c+ δ + τ
]
, (D.46)
thus the fixed point is unstable since δ + τ > 0.
(2) For (x, y, z) = (1, 0, 0), the Jacobian is
J(1, 0, 0) =
[
−δ − τ −(c+ δ + τ − rc
N
)
0 c− rc
N
]
, (D.47)
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thus the fixed point is unstable since 1− r
N
> 0.
(3) For (x, y, z) = (0, 1, 0), the Jacobian is
J(0, 1, 0) =
[
rc
N
− c 0
−( rc
N
− rc+ δ + τ) rc− c− δ − τ
]
,
(D.48)
thus the fixed point is unstable since rc− c− δ − τ > 0.
(4) For (x, y, z) = ([N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 −
(δ+τ)[N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
(r−1)c ,
(δ+τ)[N(r−1)
r(N−1)
]
1
N−1
(r−1)c , 1 − [
N(r−1)
r(N−1) ]
1
N−1 ),
we define the equilibrium point as (x∗∗, y∗∗, z∗∗) hereafter,
and the elements in the Jacobian matrix are written as

∂f
∂x
(x∗∗, y∗∗) = x∗∗[(1− x∗∗)
∂
∂x
(PC − PF )
−y∗∗
∂
∂x
(PD − PF )],
∂f
∂y
(x∗∗, y∗∗) = x∗∗[(1− x∗∗)
∂
∂y
(PC − PF )
−y∗∗
∂
∂y
(PD − PF )],
∂g
∂x
(x∗∗, y∗∗) = y∗∗[(1− y∗∗)
∂
∂x
(PD − PF )
−x∗∗
∂
∂x
(PC − PF )],
∂g
∂y
(x∗∗, y∗∗) = y∗∗[(1− y∗∗)
∂
∂y
(PD − PF )
−x∗∗
∂
∂y
(PC − PF )],
where

∂
∂x
(PC − PF ) = −(x
∗∗ + y∗∗)N−3
rcy∗∗(N − 1)(N − 2)
N
,
∂
∂y
(PC − PF ) = −(x
∗∗ + y∗∗)N−3
rc(N − 1)
N
[(N − 1)y∗∗ + x∗∗],
∂
∂x
(PD − PF ) = (x
∗∗ + y∗∗)N−3
rc(N − 1)
N
[(N − 1)x∗∗ + y∗∗],
∂
∂y
(PD − PF ) = (x
∗∗ + y∗∗)N−3
rcx∗∗(N − 1)(N − 2)
N
.
Then we define that p2 =
∂f
∂x
(x∗∗, y∗∗) ∂g
∂y
(x∗∗, y∗∗) −
∂f
∂y
(x∗∗, y∗∗) ∂g
∂x
(x∗∗, y∗∗) and q2 =
∂f
∂x
(x∗∗, y∗∗) +
∂g
∂y
(x∗∗, y∗∗). Thus we know that
p2 = x
∗∗y∗∗(1− x∗∗ − y∗∗)[
∂
∂x
(PC − PF )
∂
∂y
(PD − PF )
−
∂
∂y
(PC − PF )
∂
∂x
(PD − PF )]
= x∗∗y∗∗(1− x∗∗ − y∗∗)(x∗∗ + y∗∗)2N−4
r2c2(N − 1)3
N2
> 0,
and
q2 = x
∗∗(1 − x∗∗)
∂
∂x
(PC − PF ) + y
∗∗(1− y∗∗)
∂
∂y
(PD − PF )
− x∗∗y∗∗[
∂
∂y
(PD − PF ) +
∂
∂y
(PC − PF )]
= x∗∗y∗∗(x∗∗ + y∗∗)N−3
rc(N − 1)(N − 2)
N
[(y∗∗ − x∗∗)
+ (1− y∗∗)− (1− x∗∗)]
= 0.
We have q22 − 4p2 < 0 and q2 = 0, therefore the eigenval-
ues of the Jacobian matrix are pure imaginary. The dynamics
analysis of the interior of S3 and the stability of interior fixed
point can be found in the following subsection.
D.3 The Hamiltonian system
To analyze the dynamics in the interior of S3, we intro-
duce a new variable ε = x
x+y , which represents the fraction
of cooperators among members who do not contribute to the
exclusion pool. This yields
ε˙ =
xy
(x+ y)2
(PC − PD)
= −ε(1− ε)(PD − PC). (D.49)
By substituting x = ε(1 − z) and P¯ = x(PC − PD) +
(1 − z)(PD − PF ) + PF into z˙ = z(PF − P¯ ), we have
z˙ = z[x(PD − PC)− (1− z)(PD − PF )]. Thus we have
 ε˙ = −ε(1− ε)[(1− z)
N−1 rc(N − 1)
N
− rc+ c],
z˙ = z(1− z)[rc− c− δ − τ − ε(rc− c)].
(D.50)
By dividing the right-hand side of Eq. (D.50) by the function
ε(1− ε)z(1− z), we further have

ε˙ = −
1
z(1− z)
[(1 − z)N−1
rc(N − 1)
N
− rc+ c],
z˙ =
1
ε(1− ε)
[rc− c− δ − τ − ε(rc− c)].
(D.51)
Let us introduce H(ε, z) = M(z) + L(ε), whereM(z) and
L(ε) are primitives of z˙ and ε˙, which are respectively given
as
M(z) = (−δ − τ) log(1− ε)− (rc − c− δ − τ) log(ε),
L(ε) = (rc − c)[log(1− z)− log(z)]
+
N−2∑
k=1
(
N − 2
k
)
(−1)k
zk
k
+ log(z).
Then we obtain the Hamiltonian system as

ε˙ =
∂H
∂z
,
z˙ =
∂H
∂ε
.
(D.52)
Thus the system is conservative, and all constant level sets
ofH are closed curves.
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